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This paper analyzes how data in public credit registries can be used both to strengthen bank 
supervision and to improve the quality of credit analysis by financial institutions. Empirical tests 
using public credit registry data were performed in collaboration with the central banks in 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.  The results of the empirical tests confirm the value of the data for 
credit risk evaluation and provide insights regarding its use in supervision, including in 
calculations of credit risk for capital and provisioning requirements or as a check on a bank’s 
internal ratings for the Basel II’s internal rating-based approach. We also define a set of critical 
design parameters and use the results to comment on appropriate public registry design. Finally, 
the paper includes a discussion of the relationship between the different objectives of a public 
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I . Introduction 
 
Information problems have long been at the fore of analyses of credit markets.  Indeed, one 
rationale for banks is as institutions to gather information and establish relationships with 
borrowers in an effort to surmount these problems.
1 A striking feature of banks is the plethora of 
services that they offer and the economies of scope between them. For example, accounts and 




A limited number of papers have focused on whether banks should share information.  Jappelli 
and Pagano (1993), in a model with adverse selection, show that exchanging information on 
borrower type decreases default rates and reduces average interest rates. In a related paper, 
Padilla and Pagano (1997) show that information sharing among borrowers would lead to lower 
interest rates and increased lending. There is also a growing body of empirical evidence that 
suggests that the existence of credit information sharing is associated with deeper credit 
markets
3. Barron and Staten (2003), Kalberg and Udell (2003) and Cowan and de Gregorio 
(2003) all suggest there is value in the existence of private credit bureau reporting services. 
 
However, it is not clear that banks will voluntarily share information even when it is in a broader 
social interest to do so.  Jappelli and Pagano (1993) show conditions under which information 
sharing will and will not occur.  Moreover, there is virtually no theoretical analysis regarding the 
organizational structure of the private credit bureau industry.  As there are almost certainly 
increasing returns to scale in this industry, and hence there are likely to be market power, less 
than optimal service provision and higher than competitive pricing, an important question is 
whether there should be public sector intervention to enhance credit information sharing and, if 
so, what form that intervention should take. 
 
In practice public intervention does indeed take place.  First, private sector credit bureaus are 
frequently regulated.  However, this regulation normally takes the form of monitoring privacy 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Diamond (1991), Rajan (1992) and Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a review. 
2 For example, a consumer who receives a regular paycheck, pays credit cards in full and those and other bills on 
time is normally considered a better credit risk than one that does not. 
3 Jappelli and Pagano (1997), Doing Business (2003), Love and Mylenko (2003)   3
concerns and individual protection issues rather than attempting to enhance credit information 
per se.  Monopoly pricing or other restrictive practices that might limit competition or service 
provision are generally the responsibility of competition authorities that have in practice rarely 
intervened in this specialized sector.  The second form of intervention that has taken place is the 
direct (and frequently forced) provision of credit information sharing services by central banks or 
banking supervisors known as public credit registries (PCRs). 
 
World Bank surveys have documented that PCRs exist in about 60 countries worldwide and 
more nations are planning to create them in the future.
4 In countries with PCRs, supervised 
financial institutions are required to provide data on individual borrowers on a periodic basis, 
usually monthly. Core PCR data are information on the identity of borrowers, the size of any 
loans or credit lines outstanding with reporting institutions and their status.  Status implies 
whether a loan is in good standing, past due, in default or other non-accrual status.  
 
There are multiple motivations behind the development of PCRs.  Recent research has linked the 
existence of a PCR with the absence of significant private credit bureaus, weak creditor 
protection and a French civil code legal system – see Jappelli and Pagano (2003) and World 
Bank (2003). Anecdotal evidence suggests some countries originally developed PCRs to monitor 
credit by sector in the days when banks were forced into particular lending patterns.  Others were 
motivated by the simple desire that financial institutions should know the total debts (and the 
standing of the various loans) of potential borrowers in the whole financial system to make 
informed lending decisions. Another motivation was so that bank supervisors could identify the 
main debtors of the financial system and analyze more carefully loan concentration risk and 
monitor and enforce banks’ reserve policies against problem loans. 
 
Whatever the primary motivation, countries that have developed these tools have tended to find 
them useful for a wider variety of reasons that often go beyond their original thinking. This paper 
reviews many of the current uses and discuses the relationship between these competing roles 
and the design of PCRs.  There are also potential pitfalls related to PCR design and management 
                                                 
4 Not all countries replied to the World Bank survey that found PCRs in 58 countries.  The actual number is then 
likely to be significantly more than 58 worldwide.   4
and we discuss several sensitive issues regarding, for example, what data should be made public 
and when, and the relationship between PCRs and private credit bureaus.  The main focus of the 
paper is, however, on how PCRs can be used to improve the quality of credit analysis by 
financial institutions and to strengthen bank regulation and supervision.  We present multi-
country evidence of the importance of credit information sharing and on the importance of 
including positive and not just negative information. We also discuss the potential role of PCRs 
in banking regulation in the context of the proposed new capital accord known as Basel II. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we briefly discuss the development of 
PCRs across the globe, in Latin America and in more detail in the three countries where we 
conduct our empirical research.  In section III we present the empirical analysis on the gains to 
information sharing and in section IV we present a policy discussion.  This is organized around 
the various roles of credit bureaus.  In section V we then discuss the main design parameters of 
PCRs relevant to using a PCR as a complementary tool to aid in the implementation of the Basel 
II proposals.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  On the Development of Public Credit Bureaus 
 
Public credit registries (PCRs) contain information on the performance of borrowers in a 
financial system and are administered and maintained by either the central bank or bank 
supervisor. According to survey data collected by the World Bank, almost 60 countries have 
PCRs.
5 The region with the highest coverage of public credit registries is Latin America, where 
17 countries have established PCRs, including all the largest economies (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico). 
 
The first countries to establish public credit registries were in Western Europe – Germany in 
1934 followed by France in 1946. By the mid-1960s, three other European countries – Italy, 
Spain and Belgium – had also established PCRs. Early adopters included the former French 
                                                 
5 This data is based on the 2002 survey of PCRs conducted jointly by the Credit Information Group in the Vice 
Presidency for Financial Services (FSE) and by the Doing Business Unit in the Vice Presidency for Private Sector 
(PSD) as well as from previous FSE surveys on this topic. Not all countries responded to the 2002 survey, especially 
in Africa and Asia, so the actual number of PCRs is likely to be slightly greater than 58.    5
colonies in Western Africa which formed the West African Monetary Union in 1962 and 
immediately established public credit reporting following the French example. Also several 
Middle Eastern and North African nations adopted PCRs in the 1950s and 1960s - Egypt (1957), 
Tunisia (1958), Morocco (1966) and Jordan (1966), and Turkey (1951).  
 
In Latin America, Mexico’s PCR is the oldest, established in 1964, with a primary aim related to 
the policy of directing credit by sector at that time. While a few Latin American countries 
established PCRs in the 1970s and 1980s, the phenomenon really took off in the 1990s, when ten 
further PCRs were established in the region. Latin America was not alone, however, in the 
development of public credit registries in the 1990s – numerous countries in Eastern Europe and 
Asia developed PCRs over the last ten years. Moreover, many developing countries which do not 
currently have PCRs are debating their establishment including notably, China and Russia. Table 
1 in the Appendix provides basic information on countries with PCRs organized by region.  
 
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the PCRs that we use for the empirical analysis in the 
following section.  Although Mexico’s PCR was established for other motives, its main objective 
today is to provide data for banking supervision and economic analysis.  Having said that, the 
registry also distributes information on individual borrowers to banks. In line with these 
objectives, the Mexican PCR focuses on larger loans that pose a major risk to the financial 
system; data are only collected on credit exposures of US $20,000 or more and the primary 
concentration is commercial credit. 
 
The PCRs in Argentina and Brazil were established in the 1990s in response to financial crises 
also with the primary goal of supporting banking supervision.  Over time, though, these registries 
were transformed to also enhance the information to private financial institutions.  The minimum 
loan size that banks must report was then reduced, increasing the scope of information provided 
to the financial sector.  In Argentina, the PCR first focused on large loans in excess of US 
$200,000 (i.e.: 200,000 pesos at the 1:1 exchange rate of the early 1990s) but the minimum loan 
was reduced to only 50 pesos (US$50 before the 2002 devaluation and now about US$17.50). 
The Central de Risco run  by the Brazilian Central Bank began operations in 1998 and has   6
steadily expanded, progressively reducing the threshold of loan size recorded.
6  The initial 
minimum loan size of approximately US $50,000 has now been reduced to about US $2,000. 
 
Table 1 describes the key characteristics of the data collected in each registry.  There are some 
key similarities in the structure of the three registries but also important differences. An 
important element in common is that all three collect positive as well as negative information.  In 
other words, information on loans in good standing is collected as well as on loans that are 
delinquent. Also, two fields common to all three are the total amount of credit outstanding and 
the “rating” of the loan or borrower. Moreover each registry contains fields to identify borrowers 
including legal names and tax codes or national identity numbers. None of the these three 
regsitries contain descriptive or demographic information.  Differences include different 
minimum loan sizes or cutoff amounts, and also differences in the way that data are reported.  
Argentina’s PCR was revised to collect data by credit line while Mexico and Brazil maintain a 
more aggregated and standard reporting by borrower. Mexico does not collect data on interest 
rates as the others do and Brazil and Argentina collect information on maturities. 
 
The registries also all employ a “rating” which is determined by the bank subject to the rules of 
the regulator.  This rating is determined largely by the delinquency status of the loan but in each 
case may also take into account the financial status of the loan and the security or collateral 
available.  In the case of Argentina, for consumer lending and small corporate lending (of less 
than 200,000 pesos and a small part of a bank’s capital) the rating is solely determined by 
delinquency but in the case of larger corporate borrowers the rating was designed to be more 
forward looking.  In the case of Brazil where the PCR has 9 categories (compared to Argentina’s 
and Mexico’s 5), the financial status becomes more important especially to categorize loans in 
the non-delinquent (or in other words, performing) categories. 
 
                                                 
6 Resolution 2.390 of May 22 1997, of the National Monetary Council  Central Bank of Brazil, establishes the legal 
foundation for Central de Risco, while Central Bank Circulars 2.768 of 07/16/9, Circular 2.977 from 04/06/00 and 
Circular 2.999 of 8/24/0 specify details of its operations.    7
III. Empirical  Analysis 
 
Apart from providing information to bank supervisors, the standard raison d’être of a PCR, is to 
share information across financial institutions. However, there has been no empirical work 
published assessing the value of this information sharing that we are aware of, neither at the 
national or international level.  Moreover, there remains the important question as to what 
information to share.  In particular, banks are more likely to voluntarily share negative 
information.  Hence some private credit bureaus essentially work with negative information only.  
Some PCRs also only contain negative information.  However, there are certainly advantages to 
sharing both positive and negative information.  In this section we employ data from the three 
PCRs of Argentina Brazil and Mexico to illustrate the potential value of these databases.  In 
particular, we conduct two analyses.  First,  we show the importance of a PCR having both 
positive and negative information.  Second we attempt to assess the importance of information 
sharing generally. 
 
Positive versus negative information 
 
The first part of the empirical exercise tests the importance of including both positive and 
negative information in empirical models estimating borrower default. The term “negative 
information” refers to data on late payments and defaults. “Positive information” refers to 
information on borrowers that have paid their obligations on time and other descriptive data 
including loan amounts, interest rates, and loan maturities. 
 
Following Barron and Staten (2003), a credit scoring model is developed to test the importance 
of using both positive and negative data to predict loan defaults. The following equation is then 
estimated separately for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
7   
 
Pr. ( Deafult )i =  α{NEGATIVE}i + β{POSITIVE}i + ei    (1) 
 
                                                 
7 We use the probit procedure for estimations in Argentina and Mexico and a logit model for Brazil.   8
Where {NEGATIVE}i is a vector of variables conveying negative information regarding 
borrower  I;  {POSITIVE}i is a vector of variables conveying positive information regarding 
borrower i. Even though the datasets in the three PCRs are somewhat different, the variables are 
defined in a conceptually consistent manner to allow for comparability of the results. Table 2 
describes the actual PCR data used in the regressions for each of the three countries.  
 
The dependent variable is binary and takes a unit value if the borrower defaults, meaning a late 
payment of 90 days or more, and is zero otherwise. The last year of the data available is the 
default horizon and is used for defining the binary dependent variable. Data available prior to 
that, which goes back 18 months in Argentina, 12 month in Brasil, and up to 59 months in 
Mexico, is used to define explanatory variables and represents the credit history of a borrower 
with individual banks and the banking system.  
 
Only Mexico provides straight-forward information on the number of days late for loans in 
arrears, so for Argentina and Brazil
8 borrower ratings were used as a proxy for delinquency 
status. Ratings are based on a set of criteria including the number of days pastdue. In Argentina 
default corresponds to a “3” rating, and in Brazil the rating “E” was used as the default threshold. 
For Argentina, a borrower was considered to be in default for our exercise if their average rating 
across banks in the system was “3” or worse at any time during the year-long default horizon. In 
the case of Brazil there are eight ratings categories; the borrower is considered in default if it had 
a rating  “E” or worse with a given financial institution. 
 
The negative variables then include information on past late payments and defaults while 
positive variables include a borrower’s (non-default) rating, aggregate exposure, the number of 
open credit lines, and availability of collateral. To ensure consistency across countries, we 
restrict the dataset to private sector non-financial enterprises. The Mexican public registry only 
includes loans above US $20,000, this is adopted as the baseline for empirical testing in 
Argentina and Mexico. For the case of Brazil a higher cutoff, of US $300,000, was adopted.  
   9
Table 3 presents a set of regression results for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The model using 
only negative information performed as expected – the explanatory variables for past defaults 
and missed payments were highly significant and positively impact default for all three countries.  
The specification of the model with both positive and negative information also provides results 
which are broadly consistent across countries. More importantly, in each country we found that 
positive information adds to the explanatory power of the model.  If lenders can better identify 
risky borrowers, then they can reduce portfolio risk or extend more credit. We discuss this result 
in greater depth below. 
 
The positive information variables also performed consistently between countries in the sample. 
Longer credit histories were highly significant and negatively associated with default. In Mexico 
and Argentina where data on collateral were available, the relevant coefficient was statsitically 
significant and greater collateral anmounts were associated with lower default probabilities. 
Ratings data were also shown to be valuable predictors of default. For example, in the case of 
Brazil a loan with a rating of “D” was twice as likely to enter default as one rated “C” and almost 
five times more likely than one with a “B” rating. Borrowers with more open credit lines 
(Argentina) or those with accounts in several banks (Brazil) were found to be more risky. In the 
only country where data on interest rates were used - Mexico - we found a positive and 
significant relationship between the probability of default and the interest rate. 
 
In some cases, the behavior of explanatory variables was uneven across countries. For example, 
evidence on the effect of loan size on default probability was mixed. Loan size exhibits a strong 
negative impact on default in Brazil, as well as in Argentina where the coefficient is also 
negative but much weaker. In Mexico, however, loan size is shown to be positively linked to 
default, but only weakly significant.  
 
The simple credit scoring model similar to the one reported above was then used to define 
default probabilities for borrowers in country samples, using both the negative-only estimation 
coefficients and those from the complete information model with both positive and negative data. 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 The PCR in Brazil also contains information on days past due, however loans are grouped into buckets of 15 to 60, 
61 to 180 days past due and so on.  Since 90 days past due is used as a definition of default in our exercise, this PCR   10
Borrowers were then sorted for each model specification according to two different criteria: (A) 
to determine the number of borrowers who would default at given acceptance rates; and (B) to 
estimate the number of firms that would receive credit at a given default rate.  
 
Table 4A presents information on the percent of borrowers who would be expected to default at 
given approval rates for Argentina and Brazil.  The exercise shows that for any target approval 
rate, a loan portfolio selected using the complete information model has a lower default rate than 
the one selected using only negative information. For example, in the case of Argentina, if one 
wanted to extend credit to 60% of the sample population, then having access to positive 
information would reduce the default rate from 3.81% to 2.98%, a reduction of approximately 
20% on portfolio losses.  
 
In Table 4B the gains from using positive information in terms of  increased access to credit is 
demonstrated, controlling for the riskiness of borrowers.  In this ex-post exercise, borrowers 
again are sorted in order of  increasing predicted default probability and the percentage of 
approved loan applications is computed once the  portfolio default rate reaches the set target.  In 
both cases, more borrowers gain access to credit for a given default rate when using the complete 
information model than in the case of only negative information. Taking the case of Brazil, if a 
target default rate of 3% is desired, then the full model permits more than 82% of the sample 
population to obtain credit whereas this figure is only 55.8% for the negative only model – a 
difference of more than 30% in terms of providing access to credit. 
 
Individual bank versus  shared information 
 
Having established the importance of including both positive and negative information, we now 
turn to the more general issue: the value of sharing information. Using data from the Argentine 
PCR we estimate the following equation for individual financial institutions: 
 
Pr. ( Deafult )i =  αINDIVIDUALi + βSHAREDi + ei 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
information could not be used for defining dependent variable.  It was used for designing explanatory variables.   11
Where INDIVIDUAL refers to data provided only by a single institution on individual i. For 
example, total debt with a given bank  (and not total system wide debt) is employed, and initial 
rating with a given bank  (and not the average or worse rating across the system)
9. 
 
We use the scoring model to predict default probabilities for cases when banks do and do not 
share information.  In Table 5 we construct tables using the same methodology as in Table 4, to 
demonstrate gains in access to credit and improved portfolio quality for a large and a small 
financial institution
10.  Information sharing is shown to significantly improve a bank’s ability to 
determine the likelihood of default for its customers. For a target approval rate of 40%, access to 
data from a PCR reduced the predicted default rate by 41% for a large bank, from 2.2% to 1.3% 
of the relevant portfolio. The results are even more impressive when repeated with a smaller 
financial institution – the expected default rate falls by 78% when PCR data are added to the 
institution’s own information for a targeted approval rate of 40%. Since larger institutions have a 
larger and potentially more varied portfolio to begin with, it is logical that smaller institutions 
would benefit more from sharing information. As the target approval rate is increased, the 
difference between the gains for a large versus a small bank is virtually eliminated: at a 60% 
target approval rate both institutions lower defaults by about 35% and at a target 80% approval 
rate by about 20%.  
 
Data sharing can also enable both large and small lenders to increase their lending activities for a 
given level of risk or default. Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of this exercise with 
Argentine data where a default rate is targeted and then the number of borrowers who could be 
approved for that level of default is calculated. If a large bank was targeting a 5% default rate, 
then without information sharing it could extend credit to approximately 75% of the applicant 
pool compared with 84% if they had access to the PCR data – an increase of approximately 12%. 
For the small bank, the increase is even greater: approximately 18%.  
 
                                                 
9 We acknowledge that there may be an overstatement of the case for sharing information, as individual bank is not 
limited to the information supplied to the credit registry.  However, the variables used and supplied to the credit 
registry are normally used for credit scoring purposes and typically have a positive marginal effect in terms of the 
predictive power of scoring models and hence we believe that this remains a useful demonstration of the potential 
gains from sharing information. 
10 We report results for arbitrarily selected large and small bank.  Similar results hold for other financial institutions.   12
IV.  PCR Objectives and Design Parameters: A Policy Discussion 
 
As reviewed, the original motivations for the development of PCRs around the world have been 
many and varied.  However, in many instances PCRs are now used for purposes going beyond 
their original objectives. In particular we argue below that irrespective of the original motivation, 
it is likely that an established PCR can be useful to bank regulators to analyze, more 
scientifically, banking regulations pertaining to capital and provisioning.  However, we provide a 
broader policy discussion here on the often-competing objectives of PCRs and the implications 
and tensions in their design thus created.  We focus the discussion on 5 basic objectives:     
(1) to improve credit-\ access, (2) to strengthen bank supervision, (3) to promote competition,  
(4) economic research to inform macroeconomic policy making, and (5) to improve bank 
regulation.  The final objective is dealt with in somewhat more depth.  A theme throughout is 
also the relation between private credit bureaus and a PCR. 
 
1.  Improving access to credit 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, according to World Bank survey results, two-thirds of the respondents 
(39/57) consider supervised financial institutions the primary users of PCR data, while bank 
supervisors were identified by only one-third (18/57) as the primary users. Moreover, more than 
three-quarters of supervisors (44/57), indicated that the PCR was the primary source of credit 
data for financial institutions – Miller (2003).  There are several ways PCRs may enhance credit 
access.  First, and as illustrated in the empirical results above, the use of a PCR may, for a 
constant level of risk, allow a financial institution to expand its loan portfolio.  The marginal 
increase in the loan portfolio will particularly benefit those companies or individuals that have a 
sound repayment history but lack other obvious indicators of creditworthiness such as wealth or 
that lack guarantees. 
 
The use of PCR data may then enable lenders to predict credit risk more accurately and more 
efficiently. Credit registry data facilitates the evaluation of prospective borrowers, reducing the 
need for more costly and intrusive background and reference checks. If an adequate supply of 
data is available for statistical analysis, then automated or semi-automated credit decision tools   13
can be developed, reducing the cost and time required for processing loan applications. Under 
competitive market conditions this should increase the supply of credit and reduce its cost. 
 
However, there are other ways in which a PCR can affect access to credit.  A list of negative 
information, often referred to as a “blacklist”, can encourage borrowers to repay obligations so as 
to stay off the list.  The existence and use of such a database then enhances “willingness to pay”.  
However, as shown above, negative-only databases have several shortcomings compared to 
those with complete (both positive and negative) information. Negative information alone has 
less predictive power than positive and negative information combined.  Decision tools, such as 
credit scoring, are difficult to develop without positive data.  Databases with only negative 
information then tend to focus only on reducing “willingness to pay” and not on enhancing 
predictions on repayment probabilities. 
 
More generally, a database of positive and negative information assists borrowers in developing 
“reputation collateral” or proof of a good payment history.  The value that the debtor attaches to 
his or her good credit history or “reputation collateral” is likely to be greater than the value 
associated with being off the “blacklist”, especially since most negative information databases 
enable borrowers to settle claims to remove themselves from the list. This prompts eventual 
repayment of obligations but does not provide strong incentives for borrowers to conduct 
themselves responsibly over longer periods of time.  The greater the value “reputation collateral” 
is to borrowers, the harder borrowers will work to maintain good standing. Thus, if it is known 
that the database is used extensively for credit decisions then willingness to pay risks will be 
reduced further.  Again, this is particularly important for borrowers who lack physical collateral, 
such as low-income individuals or small firms. 
 
The above discussion has focused on PCRs, but a potentially valid question is that private credit 
bureaus may do something very similar, so why might a PCR be required?  There are several 
important differences between private credit bureaus and PCRs, related to the issue of credit 
access, and these differences suggest that PCRs and private credit bureaus may be complements 
and not substitutes. 
   14
One difference is that private institutions may only be willing to share negative information 
voluntarily even though it may be in a wider social interest to share positive and negative 
information – see Japelli and Pagano (1993).  The intuition is relatively simple.  Sharing 
information has a cost and a benefit.  The cost for a bank is that a competitor may learn 
something about that bank’s portfolio and the benefit is that the bank may be able to make more 
informed lending decisions and to predict default probabilities more accurately.  It is more likely 
that the private benefits exceed the costs for negative information as revealing information about 
bad clients is not so costly.  However, there may be net private costs to revealing positive 
information even though it may be beneficial to society to have that information shared.
11  And a 
regulator may compel regulated institutions to share both positive and negative information.  In 
more than 80% of the PCRs surveyed, institutions are required to report on loans in good 
standing as well as loans in arrears.
12  While private credit bureaus may be able to develop some 
of this positive credit history data, it is often a slow process and they are unlikely to be able to 
achieve full reporting from supervised institutions as in a standard PCR. 
 
A second important difference between PCRs and private credit bureaus is the type of 
information collected and the type of services offered.  PCRs in general only supply very basic 
information and many do not supply a true credit history, but only a snapshot of the current 
status of a borrower with the financial system.  Private credit bureaus tend to supply a greater 
quantity of information and finer information and also develop other products using that 
information, including, for example, credit-scoring products.  One view is that PCRs should only 
provide very basic information and at very low cost while private credit bureaus can take this 
information, add to it, and develop value added information services.  In this way a PCR may 
enhance the competitiveness of the private credit bureau industry.
13 
 
                                                 
11 A counter argument is that society may wish banks to retain some positive information as private. We consider the 
merits of this argument in the discussion on competition below.  
12 In some PCRs the positive information is reported but not shared or is shared subject to some cut-off.  For 
example, in the case of Argentina, information on loans with ratings 1 and 2 of less than 200,000 pesos are not 
shared in database format and there are restrictions on the number of individual hits someone can make on internet 
inquiries regarding this type of information to protect to some degree banks’ rents and hence their incentives to 
gather information on smaller clients. 
13 We come back to this point in the discussion regarding competition.   15
A third difference is that while PCRs may compel regulated institutions to supply data, they 
rarely seem to include data supplied voluntarily from other sources.  Of the 57 PCRs surveyed 
worldwide, only three (France, Slovenia and Taiwan) indicated they received any data on a 
voluntary basis and in the case of Slovenia, the voluntary data were information received from 
another government agency. It appears that firms and businesses do not wish to report sometimes 
sensitive financial data to the government on a voluntary basis in most countries. Important 
sources of credit data, typically beyond the scope of PCRs, include retail credit, trade credit, 
microfinance and information from other non-regulated financial institutions such as leasing 
firms and finance companies or independent credit card issuers.
14 Private credit registries not 
only seek to expand their access to information from a variety of lenders, but they also dedicate 
significant resources to obtaining data from other sources, such as court records and diverse 
public databases, which may not otherwise be readily available. 
 
Another important difference between public credit registries and private credit reporting firms is 
the distribution (or degree of transparency) of the data. PCRs frequently provide access to data 
only to those regulated financial institutions that are also compelled to report their data. This 
practice, known as reciprocity, is followed by 49 of the 57 PCRs in the survey. As a result, not 
only are non-reporting financial institutions denied any access to the data but also small 
businesses, non-financial businesses that provide credit and insurance firms, among others, do 
not typically have access to the data.
15 Limiting access to the data to these groups, which have 
may have justifiable business reasons for requesting the data including even the data subject’s 
consent reduces the overall impact of the data and limits the role they can play in contributing to 
transparency in an economy. In only a handful of countries do PCRs share their data with private 
credit bureaus; this also restricts the development of the credit information industry.  Finally, 
only 15 of the 57 PCRs in the survey are required by law to allow consumers access to their own 
credit reports and 29 PCRs explicitly deny borrowers any access – a violation of internationally 
recognized data protection rules.  Not surprisingly therefore, countries with PCRs tend also to 
                                                 
14 Argentina’s PCR does include data from credit card companies given on a voluntary basis under an agreement of 
reciprocity. 
15 According to survey results, non-financial firms may access PCR data in only 2 countries, insurance firms may 
only access PCR data in 3 and in general small businesses cannot request reports from the PCR, even with the 
authorization of the borrower - these remarks exclude the case of Argentina where information was freely available 
to all on the internet for “punctual inquiries” - inquiries regarding a single individual.   16
have private credit bureaus.  The survey from the World Bank finds that private credit bureaus 
exist in at least half of the countries surveyed (26/57 reported the existence of a private credit 
bureau).
16 See Figure 1 in the Appendix for a map of public credit registries and private credit 
reporting worldwide. Here, we strongly suggest that PCRs and private credit bureaus are 
complements and not substitutes. 
 
In the three countries studied in this paper, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, private credit bureaus 
exist and are the primary sources of information for many lending institutions. However, the 
public registries have played an important role in supplementing the data available from the 
private sector. For example, in Brazil most private sector credit reporting is focused on negative 
information. Since loans in good standing are not regularly reported to the private registries, 
private credit reports do not provide a full picture of the total indebtedness of borrowers. Brazil’s 
public registry provides this important information to the banking community. In Argentina, the 
PCR has helped to fill in gaps in coverage in the private reporting system since all regulated 
financial institutions are required to report to the central bank on virtually all loans. Lenders can 
obtain both positive and negative information on a case-by-case basis from the public registry for 
borrowers they are evaluating. They also receive information on all borrowers who are in arrears 
or who are in default on a monthly basis. In Argentina, the negative information from the PCR is 
also available to the private credit bureaus. In Mexico, the public registry was the only source of 
centralized credit information available to financial institutions until the mid-1990s when private 
credit bureaus were established. The development of the private industry led to a decision by the 
Mexican central bank to end the distribution of the public registry data to banks in 2002. 
 
2. Banking  supervision 
 
A second main objective for establishing a public credit registry is to strengthen banking 
supervision. In a prior survey of PCRs from 2000-2001, approximately half indicated that 
banking supervision was the most important reason for operating the public registry. In that same 
survey, 65% stated that the PCR had been “very important” in strengthening supervision of 
                                                 
16 PCR data is shared with private credit reporting firms or bureaus in Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Peru 
and Slovenia. In Argentina, negative data from the PCR is publicly available and included in private credit reports.   17
financial institutions and another 30% stated it had been “somewhat important”. Only one PCR, 
notably that of Mexico, was deemed “of little importance” for supervision; Argentina and Brazil 
both indicated that the registry was “very important” for banking supervision.
17 Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico all view bank supervisors as the primary users of PCR data. 
 
Regulators overwhelmingly report that they look at the financial institutions’ use of credit reports 
in lending as part of the supervision process (53/57) and most use PCR data to support both their 
on-site (53/57) and off-site (49/57) supervision responsibilities. More than 80% (47/57) use 
PCR-data to analyze trends in banking and credit. However, only about 30% (17/57) report that 
they use statistical models to analyze PCR data; Argentina and Mexico are among this group of 
30 but Brazil is not. The most frequent use of public registry data is to calculate the total 
indebtedness of borrowers with the financial system. A simple summation by borrower across 
institutions is the most important application for the rich datasets found in public registries for 30 
of the 57 PCRs in the survey.
18  
 
Supervisors also indicated the importance of the ratings in PCRs as a supervisory tool. Ratings 
are often used to support more forward-looking provisioning policies. Rather than relying solely 
on information on a loan’s past-due status, regulators may require banks to assign a more 
forward-looking “rating”. The rating is typically assigned by the lender to either the borrower 
(the most common) or to each line of credit according to a common scale determined by the 
regulator. Ratings may depend on arrears and cash-flow projections and estimated probabilities 
of repayment to obtain a more forward-looking measure.
19 Consistency rules between the ratings 
of different lenders to the same borrower are often established e.g.; two lenders cannot input 
ratings that differ by say more than one point on the scale otherwise the system rejects both.  
Depending on the sophistication of the system, including ratings will require a higher degree of 
supervisory oversight to ensure that ‘ratings’ are consistent and to resolve disputes.  Nearly 60% 
(33/57) of the PCRs surveyed, collect rating information including all Latin American countries 
                                                 
17 These questions were not asked in the subsequent 2002 PCR survey. 
18 Other answers to the question on the most important supervisory use of PCR data included: to track conglomerate 
borrowing (3); for use in calculating provisions (6); to identify discrepancies between institutions in risk ratings of 
borrowers (5); for information on the status of credits (7); and other (2).   18
with the sole exception of Venezuela. Of the 33 PCRs which collect ratings, 26 distribute these 
ratings back to the financial institutions.  As public credit registries become tools to monitor and 
analyze forward-looking provisions, they may also be used to analyze capital.
20 
 
Many public credit registries, including the world’s oldest PCR in Germany, were established in 
response to a banking crisis prompted by defaults of large borrowers. Monitoring credit risk 
concentrations and informing individual banks of these risks remains a key objective for most 
public credit registries.  At the same time, in many developing countries improving access to 
credit also has high priority.  Information from the public credit registry can serve both 
objectives by allowing banks to better assess the creditworthiness of borrowers at the same time 
that supervisors use the data to monitor for risks. However, there are tensions which are created 
by these different objectives and which can affect the design of the public registry and the data 
collected.  
 
One of these tensions concerns the size of loans to be included in the PCR. From a lender’s 
perspective it would be preferable to have data available on all loans regardless of size, since 
credit reports are particularly important for consumer and small business lending. Supervisors, 
however, may prefer to focus the database on large loans which pose a systemic threat. Also, by 
establishing a minimum loan size for inclusion in the PCR, supervisors can drastically reduce the 
size of the database, making it easier to manage and to enforce quality standards.
21 
 
Figure 1 provides information on the minimum loan sizes included in PCRs by region measured 
by the ratio of the cutoff amount to GNI per capita. In the World Bank survey 23 countries did 
not have any minimum loan size or had a very low minimum loan size indicating the important 
role these registries play as a provider of information to financial institutions.  Virtually all 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 In some PCRs where the rating is on the credit line, collateral may also affect the rating.  Another view however is 
that the rating should be that of the borrower and that collateral only enters in determining the level of provisioning 
to ensure greater comparability of ratings across borrowers. 
20 We come back to this in the discussion on banking regulation below. 
21 Some years ago, the cost in terms of computer hardware may also have been an issue however given the effective 
doubling of computing power every two years (so-called Moore’s Law – see 
http://www.intel.com/research/silicon/mooreslaw.htm) and the even faster development of computer storage media, 
this does not seem to be the relevant constraint.  As indicated in the text the constraint is really related to the 
management and particularly on the issue of ensuring reasonable quality control.   19
countries in Latin America, are in this category.  Thirteen countries had a minimum loan size 
requirement of ten times or more GNI per capita.  Saudi Arabia (USD 1.3 million), Jordan (USD 
1.4 million) and Germany (EURO 1.5 million) are the countries with the largest cutoff 
requirements where the credit registry is used mostly for bank supervision and systemic risk 
monitoring.  Regarding the countries analyzed in this paper, Argentina has a very low minimum 
cut-off, of 50 Argentine pesos (previously US$50 and now roughly US$18), Brazil has a 
minimum of US$ 2,100 down from US$ 50,000 several years ago and Mexico begins at US$ 
20,000. 
    
The supervisory agenda is also often apparent in the type of data collected in a PCR. The most 
obvious example of this is the lack of transparent data on payment status for loans, which is the 
heart of most private credit bureaus. Only about one-third (18/57) of PCRs collect a straight-
forward borrower payment history which shows the number of on-time and late payments and 
defaulted loans and which indicates the extent of arrears (30 days, 90 days, 180 days late, etc.). 
To some extent this data is contained in ratings as described above, since payment status is a key 
determinant of a rating. However, since other more subjective factors can bear on the rating, such 
as a bank’s estimate of the probability of default, ratings data are less transparent and more 
difficult to verify than objective payment data. Another variable which is very valuable for credit 
evaluation but often neglected by public bureaus is address information, which is lacking in 
about 40% of PCRs. Other data which are important for assessing creditworthiness, such as 
employment data and demographic data are also absent from a significant proportion of PCRs.  
 
3.  Economic research, macroeconomic policy and control 
 
Credit bureau information can also be important for macroeconomic intelligence.  Credit bureau 
information can be considered by region, by sector, by quality of borrower and used to analyze 
the credit market and interest rate developments in detail.  Moreover, the dynamics of asset-
quality can be highly illuminating in assessing activity and growth, by region or sector and 
macroeconomic risks.  For example, an increase in the movement of loans to lower grades in a 
particular sector or region may highlight particular economic problems and risks in that area or 
sector.  This information may be invaluable for a Central Bank to understand the transmission of   20
monetary policy and to guide monetary policy decisions.  Credit bureau information can also be 
used by the tax authorities to improve fiscal control and to analyze the effect of different tax 
policies on credit flows. 
 
4. Competition   
 
A further set of objectives relates to competition and performance in the credit market.  The 
effects of information on market structure and market conduct may be somewhat complex, 
however, more information regarding credit risk is likely to make a banking system more 
competitive and indeed as more credit information is made more publicly available, competition 
between banks and non-banks should also be heightened. 
 
Arguably the very raison d’être of banks is to establish profitable lending relationships with 
clients where information is costly to acquire.  Given that relationships tie borrowers in to 
particular lending institutions, that institution may then acquire a type of local monopoly power.  
However, relationship lending may still be preferable to issuing a security (non relationship 
lending), as the return that would have to be offered to the market (given the assumed poor 
information) may still be more than the price that the local monopolist bank would offer having 
invested in the relationship.  Rajan (1992) computes an equilibrium in which firms may borrow 
from both banks and in the open (bond) market such that issuing in the market controls the local 
monopoly power of the bank.  In a model that allows entry into the banking sector, if information 
is very poor and local monopoly rents very high, then we may expect a highly fragmented 
banking system with many banks, low economies of scale and a high cost of credit. 
 
Typically, theoretical models assume some type of asymmetric information that a bank may 
overcome by investing (a fixed cost) in a relationship.  However, as discussed above, a PCR may 
force banks to share this information.  This may reduce the rents available to the bank and may 
lead to multiple and quite subtle effects.  One concern is that banks will lose the incentives to 
search for clients thus potentially even having a negative effect on credit availability.  On the 
other hand, making such information available cheaply may push more credits from banks to 
non-banks reducing overall intermediation costs and increasing credit availability.  Perhaps more   21
realistically for the case of developing countries, forcing banks to share some of the information 
may reduce the rents from private information and push the sector towards larger, less 
fragmented and more efficient institutions.  In short, there is then a subtle relationship between 
information availability and credit market competition and this remains an area where further 
research on the implications of sharing credit information would be helpful. 
 
The competitiveness of the credit market is also related to the competitiveness of the market in 
information itself and as we have argued above a PCR will normally, and should normally, co-
exist with private credit bureaus.  This is most definitely not an issue of either/or.  However, the 
private credit bureau market, in general, will have sharply increasing returns to scale, and is often 
dominated by a few large players - especially in smaller countries where there is a very real 
danger of only one significant private company that will then have severely diminished 
incentives for responsiveness to client demands and innovation and may charge high prices.  The 
existence of a PCR can assist entry into the private credit bureau market by lowering entry costs 
in making a set of basic credit information available at low cost.  A healthy, competitive private 
credit bureau industry should then be free to compete on adding additional information and 
developing other value-added services such as credit scoring products rather than surviving on 
information-rents alone. 
 
The design features of public credit registries can also impact upon the role they will have in 
promoting competition in both financial and non-financial markets. For example, it is important 
to attempt to widen the access to PCR data beyond common rules regarding reciprocity for 
access to the data.  This may impact considerably on competition in other sectors including 
insurance and even trade where trade credit is important. 
 
The policy with respect to the assignment and distribution of borrower ratings by a PCR also 
may potentially impact competition in a financial market. For example, if ratings are tied in a 
one-to-one fashion to provisioning requirements, this could discourage lenders from undertaking 
more detailed analysis of marginal borrowers and unduly restrict credit to this market segment. 
Distributing the borrower ratings back to the financial system as part of the PCR credit report 
may also create incentives problems. For example, if banks know that when they lower a   22
borrower’s credit rating, other institutions will be asked to follow suit
22 they may be reluctant to 
change ratings to accurately reflect a borrower’s situation. This is especially true if their 
exposure to the client is significant and they don’t want other banks to shut off credit. Small 
banks may also be tempted to just follow the lead of large institutions in assigning borrowers 
ratings and limit or forego independent risk analysis which both detracts from competition in the 
market and also introduces additional risk if these smaller institutions are not performing due 
diligence on their own lending portfolios.   
 
 4. Banking regulation 
 
Credit registry information can also assist in the determination or refinement of the regulatory 
rules themselves.  Many public credit registries are intimately tied to provisioning rules.  PCR 
information can be used to analyze if current provisioning is adequate.  In some cases, the very 
design of the PCR reflects the provisioning rules in place so there is an important feedback 
between rules, the information that is generated and the subsequent refinement of those rules.  
However, PCR information can be used more widely.  In particular it may be employed to 
assess, not only provisioning, but also capital and also complementary regulations on 
concentration and related lending.  In short, a PCR can be a valuable tool to understand the 
portfolio credit risks of either individual institutions or the whole financial system and assess the 
overall level of reserving (capital and provisioning) in relation to those risks. 
 
In relation to regulations regarding capital adequacy, a common view is that forward-looking 
provisions should reflect expected losses and capital should reflect unexpected losses.  These are 
simply two statistics from the same probability of loss distribution curve and hence if PCR data 
is useful for considering expected loss it is surely useful to analyze unexpected loss as well.  The 
sum of expected and unexpected loss (up to some statistical confidence limit) is normally 
referred to as the Value at Risk.  As reviewed in a companion paper in this project, countries may 
be able to build on PCR databases in order to transition to the more advanced approaches of 
Basel II that uses an estimate of a loan’s Value at Risk to calibrate capital requirements.
23 
                                                 
22 Many PCRs require that borrower ratings be uniform across institutions or at least similar, such as differing by 
only one rating category. 
23 See Basel Committee for Banking Studies (2003) and in particular the Internal Rating Based Approach.   23
As of today, however, few public registries are using their data in these more sophisticated ways. 
Only six of the 60 public registries surveyed indicated that the main use of PCR data in 
supervision was for provisioning
24 and even then, it was in the context of ensuring that problem 
loans were identified so that adequate provisions could be assigned, not for forward looking risk 
mitigation. 
 
An important observation is that the typical structure of a PCR does not match Basel II’s 
minimum requirements for data for the IRB approach.  Basel II suggests that there should be at 
least two dimensions for such data (i) on the risk of the borrower and (ii) on the instrument.  
Regarding the risk of the borrower, there should be at least 7 rating buckets or grades for loans 
that are not in default and at least one grade for loans in default.  The proposals state that, “a 
borrower grade should be defined as an assessment of borrower risk on the basis of a specified 
and distinct set of rating criteria, from which PD (probability of default) estimates are derived.”   
Banks with loans concentrated in one a particular market segment should define rating grades 
such that loans are not unduly concentrated in a particular grade.  The description of the ratings 
grades should be sufficiently detailed and clear to ensure loans of similar risks are classified in 
the same grades and that a third party can understand the assignment of borrower ratings.  Rather 
than countries’ rushing to adapt their PCRs to this standardized description, we suggest here that 
PCRs may play two useful distinct and roles in terms of Basel II implementation. 
 
First, and as suggested in a companion paper, for those countries applying the simpler Basel II 
approaches, the databases may be used to enhance forward looking provisioning such that capital 
plus provisions reflect an overall estimated Value at Risk.  This implies setting capital 
requirements equal to, say, those given by the Standardized Approach (SA) and then setting 
provisions to equal the Value at Risk minus the SA capital requirement.  This would allow 
countries with a low penetration by rating agencies (the majority of developing countries) to link 
banks’ reserving policies to risk but falling short of full IRB implementation.
25  The ratings 
would be those of the banks but as the rating scale would be centralized, and the database would 
not comply with the full Basel II requirements, this could not formally be referred to as an IRB 
                                                 
24 These six countries are: Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Madagascar, Peru and Vietnam. 
25 The standardized approach links banks’ capital requirements to the external credit rating of borrowers.   24
approach.  In the companion paper, and after Powell (2004), we name this the Centralized Rating 
Based approach – CRB. 
 
Second, for countries that do allow some banks to apply the Basel IRB approaches, PCRs may 
play an invaluable role to monitor banks’ internal ratings to allow for more effective control of 
these new regulations.  In this case, the critical variable would be banks’ internal ratings and the 
other information that allows for the calculation of the capital requirement.  There are two paths 
that a regulator might choose here which we designate here as the “leader” and the “follower” 
approach.  To a large extent the appropriate choice will depend on the degree of sophistication of 
the financial institutions in the country concerned and the stage of Basel II, IRB preparedness.
26  
 
A “follower” approach would be to solicit how banks’ internal ratings information systems are 
constructed and (re)-design the PCR to reflect the best practice (or a common denominator of 
best practice). A “leader” approach would be to suggest to banks, ex ante, what data the 
supervisor will require, for a bank to be allowed to implement the IRB approach, and what subset 
of that data will be required to be reported for inclusion and possible distribution to a wider 
public as part of the PCR.  This approach implies that the regulator will influence more strongly 
the format of the internal databases that banks will then maintain. 
 
The result of the two approaches will be somewhat similar in that banks will have to maintain 
their own internal information systems (that should comply with Basel II’s minimum 
requirements) and be able to send from those databases, the data that the regulator requires; a 
subset of which may appear within the PCR.   In turn this requires a mapping from banks’ own 
internal rating systems to a regulator’s standardized scale, where the latter may not comply with 
Basel II minimum requirements. 
 
Naturally, not all variables that banks have in their internal databases need necessarily be 
included in the PCR, and not all variables that are included in the PCR need necessarily be 
shared across all institutions nor reported more widely to other interested parties.  There are 
                                                 
26 To a large extent this reflects a standard problem for regulators when considering a new regulation.  The only 
issue here is that in this case the databases can be very large in principle covering all clients of the bank.   25
strong distinctions to be made between a) what is reported to the regulator for supervisory 
purposes, b) what is to be shared between financial institutions to improve information on the 
debtors of the financial system and to improve the risk management practices of non-best 
practice banks and c) what is disclosed more widely to enhance creditworthiness assessments 




We believe that this is the first paper that has presented multi country empirical evidence on the 
value of Public Credit Registries.  The empirical tests show that PCRs may improve credit access 
for borrowers for the same level of bank risk or reduce bank risk for the same level of credit 
access. 
 
The empirical results also highlight several interesting features related to the design of PCRs.  
First, the empirical tests showed the added value of having positive as well as negative 
information on borrowers.  These results were robust across countries.  Second the results 
showed that  small banks benefit even more than larger institutions from sharing credit 
information.  Third, the results illustrated the importance of having a bank rating, as ratings were 
highly predictive in determining default risk. 
 
While the three countries included in the empirical work (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) all have 
private credit bureaus as well as PCRs, we argued that PCRs and private credit bureaus are 
complements and not substitutes.  PCRs generally include positive information while banks may 
only be willing to share negative information voluntarily.  PCRs typically cover all regulated 
financial institutions but tend to lack other voluntary data providers that private firms may 
capture. The private credit bureau industry is typically one of strong increasing returns to scale 
and hence prone to monopoly and restrictive practices; a PCR may lower entry costs and hence 
make the private industry more competitive. Finally, PCRs typically only share very basic 
information while private credit bureaus can add further information and supply higher value-
added services on a more competitive basis. 
   26
PCRs have been found to have more uses than their original motivation.  We presented a 
discussion of five key objectives of PCRs and the design tensions that these competing 
motivations often imply regarding PCR design.  For example, banking supervisors are typically 
interested in the larger debtors of the financial system, loan concentration risk and the risks that 
they present to regulated institutions, while financial institutions have more interest in sharing 
information on smaller borrowers where information gathering is more costly. 
 
Finally we discussed the possibility of using PCRs to enhance monitoring of forward-looking 
provisioning rules and to assess bank capital adequacy.  The relevance of this discussion is 
sharpened by the recent Basel II proposals to link bank capital requirements more closely with 
economic risk and in particular value at risk type estimates of bank claims.  In particular we 
suggest that PCRs may play two distinct roles depending on the Basel II implementation strategy 
of the country concerned. 
 
For those countries that have decided to implement the Basel II simpler approaches such as the 
Standardized Approach but that wish to link bank reserving policies more closely with risk, 
PCRs may be useful to enhance forward looking provisioning.  For those countries that wish to 
implement Basel II’s Internal Rating Based Approach, then PCRs may play an important role in 
monitoring and checking the consistency of banks’ internal ratings.  Each approach has strong 
implications for PCR design. 
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Figure 1.  Minimum Loan Size for Inclusion in the PCR. 
Horizontal axis measures ratio of minimum loans size requirement to GNI per capita.  Vertical 































Table 1.  Key characteristics of the credit registries in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
 
 Argentina  Brazil  Mexico 
Name of the registry  Central de Deudores del 
Sistema Financiero (CDSF) 
Credit Risk Center  Public Registry of Credit 
Information 
Year of establishment  1991  1997  1964 
Minimum cutoff amount 
(USD, 2001) 
50   2,000  20,000 




Firms: 1.35 mil 
Individuals: 6.1 mil 
 
Level of data aggregation  Each credit line is reported 
separately for each 
borrower with each bank. 
Credit is aggregated for 
each borrower within each 
bank 
Each credit line is reported 
separately for each 
borrower with each bank. 
Information collected 
Borrower identification  Name, ID number  Name, ID number  Name, ID 
Industry or sector  Industry, sector   Industry  Industry 
Region N/A  N/A  Yes 
Other information 
identifying borrower  
Residence N/A   
Currency Yes    Yes 
Days past due   No  Yes,  in buckets:  from 15 
to 60 days, from 61 to 180 
days, from 181 to 360 days 
and more than 360 days 
No 
Total amount of credit 
outstanding  
Yes Yes Yes 
Total number of open credit 
lines for a given borrower  
Yes No  Yes 
Provisions Yes  No  No 
Collateral   Type, coverage  No  No, but the type of the loan 
allows to determine 
whether the loan is 
collateralized 
Ratings    5 categories; for retail loans 
rating is mostly  based on 
delinquency status; for 
corporates – it also includes 
analysis of the financial 
status of the borrower 
9 categories; classification 
is based on delinquency 
status as well as financial 
standing of the borrower 
and security 
5 categories; classification 
is based on delinquency 
status as well as financial 
standing of the borrower 
and security 
Interest rate  Yes  No  Yes 
Maturity Yes  No  Yes 
Other  Financial statements and 
balance sheet data for large 
borrowers; ratings and 
ownership of banks 
No Renewals 
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Table 2.  Data description and definition of variables 
 
  Argentina Brazil  Mexico 
Number of 
observations 
93,000   197,000 
Min loan size  USD 21,000  USD 300,000  USD 21,000 
Credit history  June, 1999 – December, 
2000 
October 2000 - October 2001   
Default 
horizon 







Default – dummy variable 
equals 0 if a borrower 
average rating across the 
system is less than 2, and 
equals one otherwise.  
One of the criteria for 
assigning a rating 3 or 
worse is delinquency of 
90 days or more. 
Default – dummy variable 
equals 1 if a borrower 
rating with a given bank 
equals E or worse, and 
zero otherwise.  One of the 
criteria for assigning a 
rating E or worse is 
delinquency of 90 days or 
more. 
Default – dummy variable 
equals 1 if borrower has 
missed 3 or more consecutive 
payments (equivalent to 90 
days or more) over the period 
of default horizon 
NEGATIVE  Previous Default – dummy 
variable equals 1 if 
average rating across the 
system was higher than 3 
at any point in time, 
equals 0 otherwise 
Missing Payments – dummy 
variable equals 1 if 
average rating across the 
system falls between 1.5 
and 2.5  (a proxy for 
delinquencies of less than 
90 days) at any point in 
time, and equals 0 
otherwise. 
Previous Default- proportion 
of the total debt of the 
borrower in categories E 
through H (overdue of 90 
days or more) 
Missing Payments – 3 
variables: (i) dummy 
variable equals 1 if 
borrower has delinquent 
payments in October 2001;  
(ii) dummy variable equals 
1 if in a given month more 
than 10% of credit 
outstanding is past due;  (iii)
proportion of outstanding 
credit that is past due in 
October 2001 
Previous Default – dummy 
variable equals one if borrower 
has defaulted before (missed 3 
or more payments in a row), 0 
otherwise  
Missing Payments – dummy 
variable equals 1 if borrower 
has missed payments (less than 
3 in a row), and 0 otherwise 
Restructure – dummy variable 
equals one if loan was 
restructured,  and 0 otherwise 
POSITIVE  Total Debt –debt 
consolidated across all 
financial system for a 
given borrower 
Credit lines – number of 
open credit lines in the 
system 
Collateral – ratio of value of 
collateral to the value of 
the loan 
Average rating – average 
rating of the borrower over 
the credit history period 
Length of Credit History – 
number of months 
borrower appears in the 
Central de Deudores over 
the credit history period 
Initial Rating – initial rating 
of a borrower is decomposed 
into 4 dummy variables 
corresponding to risk 
classification A – D, AA is 
used as base. 
Worst rating – worst rating 
that the borrower has 
received over the period of 
credit history, the variable is 
decomposed into 8 dummy 
variables corresponding to 
risk classifications A – G, 
AA is used as base 
 
Initial Amount – initial loan 
amount 
Total Debt –debt consolidated 
across all financial system for 
a given borrower 
Collateral – dummy variable 
equals 1 if loan is backed by 
collateral, 0 otherwise 
Initial Rating – variable takes 
discrete values from 0 (best) to 
5 (default) 
Renewals – dummy variable 
equals one if loan was 
previously renewed, 0 
otherwise 
Interest Rate – ratio of interest 
paid to loan amount 
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Table 3.   Regression results 
Models for Argentina and Mexico are estimated using probit procedure.  Logit was used to 
estimate results in case of Brazil.  See Table 2 for description of variables. Standard error in 
parenthesis, *** indicates significance at 1%,   ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. 
 
  Argentina Brazil  Mexico 












0.6184 *** 0.2957 *** 3.0542 *** 2.2780 *** 0.4368 *** 0.2039 *** Previous defaults 
   (0.0191) (0.0250) (0.1670) (0.1735) (0.00468)  (0.0087)  
0.6915 *** 0.7453 *** 1.4836 *** 1.2255 *** 0.0243 *** 0.0019 *** Missing payments 
   (0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0475) (0.0511) (0.00062)  (0.0002)  
0.0030 ** 0.00009   Restructure 
   (0.00172)  (0.0001)  
-0.0108 * -0.0656 ***    0.0000 * Total debt 
   (0.0062) (0.0111)   (0.0000)  
-0.2015 ***    -0.0001   Collateral 
   (0.0180)    (0.00008)  
History length  -0.0157 *** -0.0037   -0.00007 ***
  (0.0025) (0.0065) (0.00001)  
  -0.00049 *** Currency1 
      (0.00006)  
  -0.00690 *** Currency2 
      (0.00034)  
  -0.00031 ** Renewals 
      (0.00012)  
  0.00573 *** Interest rate 
      (0.00067)  
  0.00000   Initial amount 
      (0.00000)  
Initial rating (A)  -0.0023   0.00008 ***
  (0.0679)    (0.00002)  
Initial rating (B)  0.4667 ***
  (0.0648)
Initial rating (C)  1.0059 ***
  (0.0649)
Initial rating (D)  2.2611 ***
  (0.0730)
 




70017 70017 26631 26631 196934 176447
Pseudo R2  .12 0.14 0.068 0.129 0.56 0.65
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Table 4. Positive versus negative information sharing 
 
Panel A.  Default risks 
 
Argentina (loans of $20,000 and more) 
 
Brazil (loans of $300,000 and more) 
Default rate, percent  Default rate, percent  Target 
approval 







Percent decrease in 
default rate when 














40 %  2.45  1.53  -37.6  2.78  1.30  -53.2 
60 %  3.81  2.98  -21.8  3.37  1.84  -45.4 
80 %  6.03  5.70  -5.5  3.74  2.88  -23.0 
100 %  12.19  12.19  0.0  6.77  6.77  0.0 
 
 




Percent of borrowers approved for a 






3% 49.50%  60.22%  21.7% 
5% 75.76%  76.37%  0.8% 
7% 84.26%  86.02%  2.1% 
9% 91.95%  92.76%  0.9% 
10% 94.71%  95.24%  0.6% 
11% 97.10%  97.50%  0.4% 




Percent of borrowers approved 
for a loan 






2% 65.08%  49.20%  24.39% 
3% 82.27%  55.84%  32.13% 
4% 91.53%  84.81%  7.34% 
5% 96.23%  94.36%  1.95% 
   34
Table 5.  Gains from sharing information in Argentina. 
 




























40%  1.31  2.22 -41.0% 0.52  2.42 -78.5%
60% 2.48  3.78  -34.4% 2.94  4.5  -34.7%
80%  4.39  5.37 -18.2% 5.54  7.27 -23.8%
100% 9.52  9.52  0 12.11  12.11  0.0%
 
 




























4%  76.68  63.05 21.6% 69.72  54.33 28.3%
5% 83.86 74.82  12.1% 77.16  65.4  18.0%
6% 88.46  87.1  1.6% 82.87 74.57  11.1%
7%  93.12  92.48 0.7% 85.64  79.58 7.6%
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APPENDIX: Table 1 
 
Main Characteristics of Public Credit Registries in Countries Around the World. 
Country  Name of Registry  Year 
established 







Benin  Centrale des Risques 1979 BCEAO  6,717 5,895 35
Burkina Faso  Centrale des Risques  1979 BCEAO  6,717 11,895 35
Cameroon  Centrale Recapitulative des Risques  1972 Central Bank  0 5,488 17
Cote d'Ivoire  Centrale des Risques  1979 BCEAO  6,717 16,163 35
Madagascar  Banque Centrale de Madagascar 1973 Central  Bank  7,688 27,580 10
Mali  Centrale des Risques 1979 BCEAO  6,717 7,185 35
Mozambique  Central De Riscos De Credito  1997 Central Bank  437 11,466 2
Niger  Centrale des Risques 1979 BCEAO  6,717 7,112 35
Nigeria  Credit Risk Management System  1998 Central Bank  8,333 17,861
Senegal  Centrale des Risques 1979 BCEAO  6,717 15,360 35
SOUTHERN AND EASTERN ASIA 
Bangladesh Credit  Information  Bureau 1993 Central  Bank  878 171,003 51
China  Bank Credit Register and Consultation 
System 
1999 Central Bank  0 4,000,000 6
Indonesia  Debtor Information System 1988 Central  Bank  4,802 574,873 10
Malaysia  Central Credit Reference Information System  2001 Central Bank  0 2,500,000 16
Mongolia  Credit Information Bureau   1995 Central Bank  907 37,434 2
Pakistan  Credit Information Bureau 1992 Central  Bank  8,312 105,552 12
Taiwan  Joint Credit Information Center  1992 Ministry of Finance  0 610,000 115
Vietnam  Credit Information Centre 1999 Central  Bank  3,316 155,032 30
EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 
Belarus  Data Base on Loans Issued  1996 Central Bank  10,000 1
Bulgaria  Central Credit Register    1999 Central Bank  4,525 40,000 2
Lithuania  Loan Risk Data Base 1995 Central  Bank  13,218 24,800 2
Romania  Credit Information Bureau 2000 Central  Bank  6,300 24,241 8
Slovakia  Registry of Bank Loans and Guarantees  1997 Central Bank  0 11,634 3
Slovenia  Kreditni portfelj bank  1994 Central Bank  0 27,837 1
Turkey  The Risk Center  1951 Central Bank  6,900 487,943 25
Yugoslavia Credit  Information System  2002 Central Bank  75,207 1,513 7  36
Country 
 
Name of Registry  Year 
established 







Austria  Major Loan Register  1986 Central Bank  308,420 70,697 8
Belgium  Central Credit Registers   1967 Ministry Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance  22,030 700,000 16
France  Service Central des Risques  1946 Central Bank  66,971 700 000 47
Germany  Evidenzzentrale für Millionenkredite   1934 Central Bank  1,321,800 388,785  
 
Italy  Centrale dei Rischi  1962 Central Bank  66,090 3,156,488 33
Portugal  Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito  1978 Central Bank  44 5,077,929 14
Spain  Central de Informacion de Riesgos 1962 Central  Bank  5,287 12,066,861 25
LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN 
Argentina  Central de Deudores Del Sistema Financiero  1991 Central Bank  50 5,579,149 16
Bolivia  Central de Información de Riesgo Crediticio  1988 Superintendency of Banks  0 468,651 5
Brazil  Credit Risk Center  1997 Central Bank  2,162 7,509,964
Chile  Central de Riesgos  1977 Superintendency of Banks  0 3,214,573 6
Colombia  Sistema Integral de Riesgos  1994 Superintendency of Banks  11,000 83,000 7
Costa Rica  Servicio de Informacion Crediticia   1996 Superintendency of Banks  0 28,000 3
Dominican Republic  Central de Riesgos  1994 Superintendency of Banks  0 6
Ecuador  Central De Riesgos  1997 Superintendency of Banks  0 1,059,220 8
Guatemala  Sistema de Información de Riesgos  2002 Superintendency of Banks  0
Honduras  División Central de Riesgos  1998 National Banking and Securities Commission   0 295,900 5
Mexico  Reportes Crediticios   1964 National Banking and Securities Commission   20,000
Nicaragua  Central de Riesgo  1994 Superintendency of Banks  0 258,854 2
Peru  Central de Riesgos  1983 Superintendency of Banks  0 2,397,928 9
Uruguay  Central de Riesgos  1989 Superintendency of Banks  16,323 165,015 4
Venezuela  Sistema de Informacion Central de Riesgo  1975 Superintendency of Banks  0 2,377,695 5
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA 
Egypt  Credit Risk Dept.  1957 Central Bank  8,753 83 80
Iran  Banking Information Department 1990 Central  Bank  1,714 28
Jordan  Credit Risk Division   1966 Central Bank  42,325 97,000 6
Morocco  Central Risks Service  1966 Central Bank  8,620 5
Saudi Arabia  Banking Credit Center  1985 Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority  1,333,209 5,778 10
Tunisia  Centrale Des Risques  1958 Central Bank   13,605 40,000 8
United Arab Emirates Credit Risk Bureau   1982 Central Bank   68,068 34,289 6
Yemen  Credit Risk Information Department 1975 Central  Bank  2,926 125,000 5  37
APPENDIX Figure 1:  Map 
 
 
 
 